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STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES:
What Interactions? Notes From Namibia
Reginald Herbold Green
Achieving higher economic growth for today's population 
at the cost of an unproductive natural habitat for 
future generations is not acceptable. No time should 
be lost in putting in place, country by country, 
environmental action plans and in mobilising broadly 
based popular support fob their effective 
implementation. Extensive community-based programs to 
plant trees are also urgently required.
- World Bank, Long-Term 
Perspective Study
Pula! Pula! Pula!
(Water! Wealth! Well Buying!)
- Botswana Invocation
I. ADJUSTMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTIONS
Structural adjustment is important. Increasingly it is perceived as an 
approach to prioritisation, coherence testing, resource mobilisation and 
allocation, stabilisation and growth within a context of market force 
managed production bolstered by state provision of basic services, 
infrastructure and an enabling climate for individual, community and 
enterprise initiatives. Whether under World Bank rubrics or not, it is 
increasingly central to actual economic policy and praxis in a majority of 
Sub-Saharan African Polities and to most applied economic/political 
economic analysis of or on SSA.
Environmental protection/regeneration is also important. Looking only at 
economic consequences, present levels of ecological damage will create 
serious new macroeconomic constraints and barriers to adequate household 
livelihoods within a generation. I many cases it is need (national for 
exports to ensure overall economic survival as well as household to provide 
food and fuel to keep members alive) which drives degradation. That poses 
a dilemma - how to enable less poverty and less ecological damage to
2coexist now, to avoid irretrievable future environmental (poverty in 
particular), physical degradation and macroeconomic costs.
If environment is viewed as a separate late add on to the main goals of 
national Structural Adjustment/Transformation programmes, it will be 
underfunded and underintegrated into main lines of action. This has been 
demonstrated in the relative failure of Social Dimensions of Adjustment as 
a parallel, ameliorative project kit approach and its shift (in Bank as 
well as national thinking and - to a degree - action) to placing production 
by poor people, provision of basic services and (tentatively) selective 
safety nets as major poverty reduction priorities to be incorporated within 
main sectoral and macroeconomic priorities and programmes.
From SA To Ecological Programming?
But that case does not necessarily demonstrate that general SA analysis and 
programming is a promising entry point to building up, articulating and 
acting on the ecological front. In the abstract SA is heavily 
macroeconomic at resource allocation level and highly generalised micro 
economic at the more detailed analysis one. To deduce ecological strategy 
from either is likely to prove more than a little difficult and as argued 
extensively by R. Mearns (1991) more than a little inaccurate.
II. THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENT 
General Propositions
Ecological policy based on Structural Adjustment as entry point begins with 
three basic propositions, First, increased price (reward) for a product 
will result in increased production of that product. Second, increased 
resource allocation to producing something (e.g. agricultural research) 
will result in higher output. Third, increased efficiency in resource use 
will lead to increased output, especially of the products on whose 
production the efficiency increases are centred.
These are valid and powerful propositions. However, their applicability in 
any particular case rests on the applicability of certain assumptions.
First - external (to the actor) costs and benefits are low (e.g. the 
prudent irrigation water user gets most of the gains and the imprudent
3bears most of the costs of his/her actions). Second - non-pecuniary 
resource constraints (e.g. knowledge) are relatively few and relaxable. 
Third - resources for investment now to achieve future gains can be 
mobilised (e.g. a hill farmer can - if output prices justify - borrow 
resources to terrace to sustain/increase yields). Fourth - changes in 
output level/technique carry low perceived and actual catastrophic risk 
level (e.g. introduction of a hybrid seed trebling output in normal 
rainfall years but quartering them in drought ones will not take place at 
the onset of a drought cycle). Fifth - individual and social valuation of 
future, as weighed against present, gains are roughly the same (e.g. the 
peasant household which must grow a crop to eat this year values future 
gains from erosion protection similarly to society as the trustee of future 
generations and is able to act on that valuation).
Unfortunately in applied environmental policy and praxis these assumptions 
are open not only to particular exceptions but also to doubts as to general 
applicability.
And Their Articulation
»
From these general propositions it is perfectly possible to articulate to 
the probable environmental (or other) impact of particular SA policy 
instruments. From there it is possible to work out the ecological 
significance of a specific Structural Adjustment Programme instrument by 
instrument and - less clearly given aggregation and interaction problems - 
overall.
This has been done in the case of Malawi. The various contributions have 
been synthesized and then summarised in tabular form by Mearns (op cit).
The initial impression is of an analytical framework of very considerable 
articulation, explanatory and projective power capable of providing a large 
number of insights and opportunities for action. Such a systematic 
exploration can identify dangerous policies, new opportunities, the support 
(or otherwise) instruments adopted for non-ecological reasons can give to 
ecological strategy articulation and praxis. Doubts arise when it is 
suggested that it is also a convenient entry point for constructing 
national environmental strategies and programmes.
4SAPS As Ecopolicy Systems: Some Limitations
First, the SA based analysis indicates directions rather than quantifiable 
estimates of how much, how fast, how adequate to the needs/goals specific 
to the sector concerned.
Second, considerable uncertainty as to results arises in some cases, for 
example, price changes will alter crop mixes and production techniques. If 
shifts reduce trees relative to field crops and surface cover intercropping 
relative to spaced row single stands, the direct ecological results are 
likely to be negative whatever the indirect ones of more income available 
for all uses.
Third, in general the ecological results of SAP instruments can be expected 
to be incremental and slow.
Fourth, the environmental impact of SAP instruments is a side effect not 
the major reason for their adoption (with some exceptions in the case of 
forestry). This implies that their adequacy is unlikely.
Fifth, for the general incentives flowing from SAP instruments to be 
effective, specific resources and contexts (enabling environments) not 
contained in nor deducible from the instruments themselves are likely to be 
necessary. The problems are particularly acute - as the Bank's LTPS (Bank 
1989) cogently stresses - for poor peasant households producing largely for 
self-provisioning. Quick, visible output gains and initial techniques 
requiring primarily off-season labour time plus specific physical inputs 
with low cash cost appear to be a virtual sine qua non.
Sixth - the interaction of multiple instruments with different impacts is 
difficult to aggregate and depends substantially on the speed and sequence 
of instrument application. For example, ending fertiliser subsidies by 
itself is likely to reduce their use (especially by poorer farmers on 
poorer soils) with negative consequences. Introducing competition and/or 
marketing cost/profit margin compression increases grower incomes and is 
likely to result in enhanced fertiliser purchases. If the second is 
sequenced to lead the first the net effect may be positive environmentally; 
but, if the first is the lead instrument, the reverse is likely.
Seventh - and perhaps most crucial - the cases in which the deductions from 
the general propositions through specific instruments to actions will be
wrong (i.e. the direction of change will be the opposite of that expected) 
are not trivial. Some are counterintuitive (e.g normal economic logic is 
neither dominant nor complementary to the dominant logic on which the 
relevant decisions are made). Most are not genuinely counterintuitive but 
result from specific contexts in which the economic logic of the actors 
posits actions other than those generally predictable.
This critique should not be read as a case for the World Bank to "get out 
of the environment business". The Bank's Environmental Department is not 
solely - or even primarily - concerned with SAPS. (Indeed field experience 
with SAP construction in SSA suggests its involvement is extremely 
peripheral.) Its strength in respect to assessing the ecological and 
environmental consequences (positive or negative) of particular projects 
and programmes and in identifying ways to manage and to enhance or offset 
them would appear to be both greater and more readily enhanceable than its 
direct contribution (as opposed to environmental vetting and monitoring) of 
SA and SAPS per se.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Therefore a case can be made for an alternative route to interaction. This 
would be country based for analytical and strategic purposes although 
necessarily built up from zonal and local sub-contexts nationally and cross 
country coordinated when appropriate (e.g. Okavango water management at 
some levels requires coordinated strategic planning and action by Angola - 
Namibia - Botswana).
Its starting point would be environmental themes, issues, trends as they 
related to/were perceived by households, civil society and governmental 
units as decision takers, e.g. water with sub-categories of use allocation 
and levels, preservation of supplies, augmentation of flows, erosion, 
pollution. This accepts the premises that for most human and human 
institutional actors the ecological environment is a set of resources whose 
importance lies largely (by no means wholly in respect to persons, 
households and civil society units with strong cultural or religious 
beliefs in respect to some or all aspects of nature) in its contribution to 
their present and future well-being and that most decisions affecting 
environment will not be free standing but integrally involved in multi­
6faceted decisions/actions (e.g. which fields to crop, graze, fallow using 
what techniques) taken for reasons which are not merely not solely but not 
even primarily ecological.
Broad environmental protection/management/regeneration perspectives and 
some rules of thumb for what to do (and not to do) in the presence of 
imperfect data to inform decisions which will in fact be taken (adequate 
data or not) can be articulated moderately quickly and potentially in 
operational form. The problems of articulation (specific cases, specific 
data, specific techniques, specific monitoring) are fairly standard in the 
sense that they are not radically different in kind from those relating to, 
e.g. crop production or primary health access development. Those of 
interaction may be - or may seem to be because they are inadequately 
perceived and acted on in respect to other themes. The dominant one is 
physical/natural ecology and human environment. The human environment of 
most of Sub-Saharan Africa (urban as well as rural) is one of poverty and 
of urgent, immediate need. If environmental themes and actions do, and can 
be seen to, address these realities positively they can get on agendas from 
personal/household to cabinet/presidential; otherwise they have little 
chance.
Environmental policy and practice is highly decentralised in two senses.
Its themes/programmatic areas crosscut sectoral lines, e.g. purity and 
preservation of flows of water relates to Agriculture and Livestock, 
Industry, Mining, Urban Affairs. Further, it is in direct contact with and 
directly affected by the actions of most or all households as well as by 
those of key enterprise, governmental and civil society decision-takers. 
From this flow several operational/institutional implications:
1. a strong data collection, analytical, strategic formulation, policy and 
programme design unit to shape perceptions, catalyse - coordinate - 
monitor - action is likely to be both feasible and necessary but an 
operational line ministry is not;
2. community support and operational involvement is necessary if many 
aspects of protection (e.g. wildlife), management (e.g. water) and 
regeneration (e.g tree-shrub-bush cover) are to be implemented beyond 
large actor enclaves;
3. neither main line ministries nor communities (and their member 
households) can afford to give priority to ecological protection, 
management and regeneration unless they are convinced that not doing so 
will have high medium term costs and that doing so is possible using 
technically (including time required) and economically feasible means 
and will yield palpable benefits (e.g larger crops, tourist related 
payments, more water to allocate);
4. therefore, a network from community/household action through line 
operating bodies to central decision-taking units (with a sub-chain in 
the other direction to large operating units such as mines, irrigation 
schemes, fishing fleet operators) serviced and catalysed by the 
ecological unit is potentially feasible whereas a normal sectoral top 
down, single dominant actor one is not.
IV. TOWARD A RURAL NAMIBIAN ECO-ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 
The Unforgiving Land
t
Environment, at least as a social science or a political process, is about 
human beings as well as about ecology in the narrower sense. To apply Adam 
Smith on the incompatibility of sustained national wealth and human misery 
- no ecological zone can be healthy and sustainable the majority of whose 
residents survive in misery and extreme need.
The ecology is basically that of semi-arid to desert lands - fragile, easy 
to damage, hard to restore. The human condition is - for most rural 
Namibians - one of severe to absolute poverty in an institutional context 
and economic structure which (even post-apartheid and with independence) 
offers no easy ways out.
Namibia is a very large country with very little good land. Over half is 
desert or economically void mountains. The balance is largely low carrying 
capacity - from 30 ha per large stock unit in the South to 7 to 10 in the 
North. Under 10% of the usable land can be cropped without irrigation - a 
band across the North 200 km deep; the highland kaarstveldt and a lesser 
artesian area on the east central Kalahari margin; on the Windhoek-Coast 
highway where mountain water percolates and - with irrigation - at 
Mariental and on the Orange River. In no case is local rainfall alone
8adequate - seepage from perennial rivers, seasonal floods and or mountain 
fed aquifers are at least as important in each zone.
75% of the usable land is owned by about 2,700 settler and 300 black
families and support about 50,000 farm workers and about 200,000 
dependents. 25% (but 75% of arable) is 'communal' with about 100,000 
complete and 100,000 divided families on it.
Two realities - of ecological fragility and of human need - interact. In 
the North more people on the same land area have pushed beyond the margins
of ecological sustainability of soil and of vegetation. Need, not greed,
is the destructive dynamic so far as the rural households are concerned, 
although the ultimate cause is past European rancher greed for land. In 
the Centre and South, many ranches built on underpaid labour do not earn 
plausible returns on resources used and often have pushed the ecology to or 
beyond the tipping point into secular degradation. In the 1890s many 
ranches near Windhoek had seasonal open water and neither erosion gullies, 
nor the compacted, impermeable surface soil that leads to them. To argue 
whether worker need or rancher greed/need is key is to miss a basic 
reality: no ranching system which cannot provide decent living conditions 
(including income, housing, nutrition and access to basic services) to its 
working households, a positive return on capital used and production 
patterns ecologically friendly enough to halt/avert secular degradation can 
be sustainable.
Namibia is inherently short of physically and economically accessible 
water. The total reasonable urban household, mining, industrial, rural 
household, livestock and crop demand is beyond economically viable and 
ecologically sustainable flow levels. Hard choices have to be made by use 
and by location. To seek to avoid them by drawing down stocks (as appears 
to be happening now in the Kaarstveldt and other artesian areas) is to 
delay facing unforgiving future ecological limits.
Pula, Pula, Pula! - First Steps and Steps To Avoid
Namibia's ecology is damaged, not irrevocably destroyed. There are limits 
to carrying and self-regenerating capacity, but they can be increased. 
Judging from conversations, the press and the Independence Day Parade 
floats, environmental concern in Namibia is real and fairly widespread; an
9enabling climate necessary, even if not sufficient, for environmental 
protection and regeneration.
What is needed now is to develop a coherent, articulated, informed strategy 
in relation to sustainable environment which includes both the ecological 
and human condition strands. Because that will necessarily take time, a 
set of preliminary guide-lines and caveats may be useful:
1. be cautious in the absence of clear evidence of ecological safety -
delaying a safe gain is less damaging then incurring an irreversible 
loss (e.g. block new water pumping from reservoirs which are clearly or 
probably already being drawn down faster than the recharge rate);
2. where practicable halt ecological degradation now; at the least take 
action to slow it and set target dates for halting and beginning to 
reverse it (e.g. initiation of suitable seedling distribution and 
household tree and bush planting programmes) acceptable to rural 
households;
3. give urgent attention to ecologically friendly means of increasing the 
livelihood sustaining capacity of both the small and the large scale
farming/ranching sectors (e.g. holistic grazing systems - see Otzen, 
1990 - and surface water points to allow new grazing areas in north to
reduce pressure on core cropping areas);
4. view trees-bushes-shrubs in the context of silviculture and 
farming/ranching systems (including their livelihood effects) not only 
from forestry, fuel supply and ecological preservation perspectives;
5. build up a national (and local) water flow, stock and potential 
augmentation inventory (inventories) and enumerate present uses to 
allow 20 year perspective programmes for water development, allocation, 
charging and use and in the interim seek to halt expansion of 
unsustainable national (local) uses;
6. in parallel, proceed with water use/supply/protection agreements with 
Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa in respect of 
border rivers and trans-border drainage/basin systems;
7. review global experience on large, medium and small scale irrigation 
with a view to determining sustainability (with special reference to
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soil salination) and viability and defer large and medium scale 
expansion until clear evidence and analysis is to hand while 
experimenting in respect to small scale and, probably, small or medium 
Orange River margin pump or weir schemes;
8. evaluate shifts in production pattern and price policies (e.g. to 
encourage mixed farming, oilseeds, urban market "truck gardening", 
silviculture) in environmental and livelihood as well as physical 
supply and food price/food security terms;
9. collect data on experience and research in other SADCC countries with a
view to adaptation and field testing;
10. recognise that, except for beef and karakul, rural production is not
and will not be central to the macroeconomic dynamics of Namibia so
that ecological viability and livelihood enhancing (not narrower 
physical or financial surplus) targets should be the central ones.
Ecology - Elements, Threats and Building Blocks
It is relatively easy to draw up a check-list of threats and elements but 
remarkably difficult to articulate - especially briefly - in a policy and 
programme focused way. Data is scarce, scattered, full of gaps. Namibia 
is not homogeneous. To write specifically on land quality - use - carrying 
capacity - present situation, trends and future prospects/portents without 
specifying whether one is talking about the Kaokoveldt, the Oshana Country, 
the Okavango Valley, the Eastern Caprivi, the Otavi Highlands, Gibeon or 
the Orange River potentially irrigable zone makes limited sense.
Ecological aspects cannot be abstracted from human if one is concerned with 
M future pressures and possibilities - creating an ecological paradise at the 
expense of rural residents is neither practicable administratively nor 
politically, while sustaining rural livelihoods by ecological destruction 
is at best a short run expedient.
The key factors are land, water, vegetation, air, sea and wildlife/ 
"wilderness". The threats to them include overuse and pollution leading 
to, e.g. erosion, salination, fertility decline, quality degradation (in 
plant populations), desertification, poisoning (e.g. via polluted -
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including saline - water and airborne chemicals/radiation/dust), 
destruction of stocks (of fish or wildlife).1
Of these the sea - i.e. slaughter catching of fish, shellfish and marine 
mammal stock problem - poses an important and specific problem. However, 
the ecology of Namibia makes it virtually totally separate from other rural 
ecology and livelihood issues. Air pollution's flashpoints in Namibia are 
Rossing and Tsumeb which are limited area specific technically (but 
expensively) soluble problems little related to rural environment in 
general.
Wildlife/wilderness issues affect agriculture but in somewhat special ways 
because the basic issue is normally what land should be dedicated to which. 
In most cases the two uses are not mutually compatible on the same piece of 
land. It is at the margin that trade-offs arise. These are unlikely to be 
for small areas: in few parts of Namibia is the use of up to 5,000 ha to 
protect a scenic attraction likely to have a high agricultural opportunity 
cost and rarely is such a small area viable by itself for wildlife. The 
Skeleton Coast/Etosha corridor to link the two main wildlife preserves, 
illustrates the nature of the real and difficult choices likely to arise 
between extensive ranching and wildlife conservation, and is probably the 
most quantitatively significant and temporally urgent of them.
Wildlife and wilderness areas need to be protected and serviced - not 
merely zoned - if they are to survive. To the extent costs can be covered 
from visitor revenues without the visitors themselves wrecking what they 
come to preserve, no inherent problem arises. To the extent Namibian 
wildlife and wilderness are seen as a global and national heritage with 
claims on resources in its own right, problems of priority to that heritage 
versus priority to survival and development needs of poor Namibians arise.
Land itself is not scarce - good quality and especially croppable land is. 
Redistribution will not solve that: the 250,000-300,000 large farm workers 
and dependents are, if anything, more than can be supported on that land 
and Northern 'demand' for mixed farming land cannot be met because very 
little exists.
A more detailed review of and policy proposals for these sectors is 
available from the author at the Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK.
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Water, as noted, is scarce and expensive. Increasingly this constrains 
both agriculture and agricultural household supplies and development of 
alternative urban and mining livelihoods. Both conservation and allocation 
improvement are crucial.
Vegetation at risk includes trees/bushes and pasturage. Lessened poverty 
is crucial to restoring the first and a combination of holistic rotational 
pasture management and bringing pasturage now unusable because of the 
absence of surface water or the presence of poisonous plants are key to the 
second.
A special issue is intercropping game and cattle/sheep. To be economically 
viable as a general practice this requires a qualitative shift in export 
market links. As it is, almost certainly, environmentally valid in many 
parts of Namibia building them is a commercial priority.
Human Enjoyment and Ecology
Improving rural livelihood/access to services and housing conditions to 
avert tidal waves of in-comers to urban areas is a necessary strategic 
priority. Reconciling it with ecological damage reduction and reversal is 
not going to be easy. Pretending there is no such priority will have even 
more negative environmental consequences.
Rural inequality characterised by cramming large numbers of households or 
fragments of households into small areas of often marginal land with next 
to no attention to raising household sector productivity has been a recipe 
for growing environmental degradation as population in these areas rises. 
That is the underlying historic dynamic of much of what South Africa 
described as "homelands" or "second tier authority" areas.
These areas are characterised by need driven ecological degradation. Need 
for fuel for fodder, for crops to eat, for livestock to eat and to sell -
need, all rising with population - forces overcollection of bush,
overcutting of trees, overgrazing, cultivating too continuously with too 
little return of nutrient to the soil. In analysing and acting on this
type of downward spiral two dead end roads need to be avoided: 1.) seeking
to enforce ecological sustainability by fiat and force - unlikely to 
succeed and certain further to immiserize poor people; 2.) saying that the 
ecological damage is not the poor people's fault but the systems's (true
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enough) and that therefore nothing can or needs to be done (false, 
especially as the burden of the ecological damage will fall primarily on 
the next generations of poor people).
The large ranching/mixed farming sector initially typified the economy of 
greed - stolen land, cheap (de facto forced) labour, limited ecological 
awareness), proprietor levels of consumption vastly higher than those of 
workers which were near to or below the absolute poverty line, master- 
servant type labour relations. Reconciliation should mean not shaking 
fists (or more lethal weapons) over the past, but it must not mean 
declining to analyse it and its heritage and failing to act to transcend 
them. Worker livelihoods need to be raised and households reunited - for 
human and political reasons and also to retain a labour force.
Overstocking and under-investment in pasture maintenance and improvement 
need to be halted. The issue is - how? There are no longer (and 
historically have usually not been) large profit margins to meet these 
costs. Ranch proprietors, in general, do not have incomes above the 
professional-managerial-medium sized entrepreneurial average and often have 
sizeable debt burdens and low cash balances. Clearly either income (ranch 
cash and worker self-provisioning) must be enhanced or costs cut or both.
Routes which would reduce employment and raise capital intensity and scale 
are open to question economically and would make a serious negative 
contribution to adequate livelihood creation priority. Turning the land 
back to 'traditional' ranching would lower costs, but also output, with 
very doubtful gains to worker livelihood. Work team based approaches (or 
conversion to Batswana model large and medium scale ranches) could be 
viable if adequate knowledge, experience and skills were available. They 
are not available today - at least for broad front conversion. The status 
quo is not viable except in the very short run.
Superimposed on these two long term problems is that of the war displaced 
persons. The most visible - especially from a capital/major city 
perspective - may be those returning from abroad. However, the majority of 
displacees - especially the majority of desperately poor people among them 
- are internally displaced people from the districts loosely describable as 
the Ovambo and Kavango rural areas. These at their 1989 peak numbered up 
to 300,000 whereas rural oriented external returnees probably are well 
under 50,000. The end of the war and therefore of sales of goods and
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services to the RSA occupation forces (and now to UNTAG) has sharply 
reduced urban and peri urban formal and informal employment. Many of these 
people need to be able to return to their homes. But they cannot return 
without systematic enabling support - tools for agriculture and for house 
building, seeds, implements, household utensils, food until the harvest, 
core livestock to rebuild that aspect of mixed farming. And unless there 
are systematic family sector household friendly programmes for reversing 
tree/bush destruction and soil depletion, their return cannot be made 
compatible with environmental stabilisation and sustainability.
"Pula, Pula, Pulal" ?
This sketch cannot constitute a complete environmental programme for rural 
Namibia. Its aim is much more modest:
1. to demonstrate the negative and systematic interactions of ecological 
degradation and human poverty in Namibia;
2. to identify the most serious environmental/ecological risks and 
downward dynamics in rural Namibia today with special reference to 
agriculture;
3. to suggest how one can ask questions about these risks/downward 
dynamics which direct attention toward humanly and ecologically 
sustainable answers - and to ask some of those questions;
4. to suggest some initial, partial answers which - if implemented - could 
improve environmental/ecological dynamics and buy time for articulating 
fuller strategies based on additional data and analysis.
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ENVIRONMENT PAPER - RESUME
Structural adjustment and environment protection/enhancement are both 
important and inevitably interact. While SA strategic and instrumental 
analysis can produce a check-list of points relevant to environment policy 
and practice, it is not a fully adeguate starting point. Contextual 
specificity, the fact that need is at least as deadly to the environment as 
greed and the number of actors involved in the success (or failure) of 
environmental practice suggest a ground up approach at national and local 
level. The potential of such an orientation - to identify issues, to 
produce check-lists for interim policy and to build toward a more informed 
holistic approach is sketched with reference to rural Namibia.
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